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1. Ethics and Scientific Procedures
In the first part of this study, I compared the ways in which Aristotle and
Michael Slote utilize common sense, meaning the opinions and intuitions of
the majority of people or some reference group among them. Both philoso-
phers center their attention on human virtue and so both may be categorized
in a very broad way as common-sense virtue ethicists. Aristotle uses common
sense only heuristically as an aid to forming opinions of his own, which he
then checks against the facts as he sees them. In contrast, Slote uses common
sense probatively. When his views accord with common sense, he takes it as a
confirmation and, at points, as a proof of their validity. He is thus a common-
sense philosopher in a more profound sense than Aristotle. My criticisms of
his views were designed to show that he is ill-advised in appealing to common
sense in the way he does. Aristotle’s guarded and limited use of it is the only
approach that can be justified in ethical theory.
I will now sketch the way in which intuitions, whether the intuitions of
all people, of a select group, or of the philosopher herself, should interplay
with theoretical considerations in her development of an ethical theory. The
department of ethical theory that I shall discuss will continue to be that de-
voted to virtue, but I shall argue that virtue as a property of persons cannot
be understood without adequate concepts of the right as a property of actions,
and the good as a property of goals.
In developing a theory of virtue from common intuitions, Slote claims
to utilize a systematic procedure exploiting an interplay between theory and
intuition. He observes that this is “a methodology at least partially analogous
with scientific methodology.”1 In developing this procedure, we would expect
him to improve measurably on Aristotle, since he has available a much more
sophisticated form of scientific inquiry as his model. To see how far the anal-
ogy between ethics and science takes him, let me sketch a classic example
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of scientific procedure. This example is Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen and
explanation of combustion, which precipitated a revolution in chemistry and
led to the development of a body of theory recognizably continuous with
that current today.2 The analysis will show that Slote does not go far enough
with the analogy and that the analogy largely impugns the probative value of
common sense as Slote uses it.
Here is the scientific story in simplified form. Lavoisier was schooled in
the chemical ideas of his time. They included the notions that macroscopic
substances are compounds of elementary substances and that their sensible
properties are caused by the properties of their elements. Boyle had intro-
duced the ideas that elementary substances are corpuscles characterized by
the primary qualities of shape, mass, and position, and that they are indivisible
by chemical means. Chemical reactions are combinations and separations of
such corpuscles, and compounds are distinguished from mixtures by the fact
that their corpuscles combine in definite proportions.
For Aristotelian science, the elementary substances are earth, air, water,
and fire. By the late eighteenth century a vast number of distinct substances
had been described empirically and it was suspected that they were com-
pounds of a much larger number of elements than the traditional four, though
water and air were still thought by many natural philosophers to be elemen-
tary. Even those who did not think so referred to gases as “airs” and dry solids
as “earths.” Fire had been replaced by a hypothetical element, phlogiston.
A vast number of chemical phenomena had been observed and described,
and chemists were acutely aware of the need to systematize them and the
inadequacy of current theories to do so.
In this context, Lavoisier was geared to view chemical phenomena as
reactions and to seek the elements involved in them. Chemists had isolated
a number of airs distinct from ordinary air, so the idea of gas as a generic
type was abroad. This suggested that ordinary air is a compound or mixture
rather than an element, and the possibility was raised that other gases could
be produced by separating the elements of air or adding other elements to
it. Combustion was explained as the release of phlogiston from combustible
substances and its absorption by the air. Since fire and hot air rise, phlogiston
was thought to have negative weight. Phlogiston was also used to explain em-
pirical phenomena that had been observed by metallurgists in the calcination
of metals into earths or calxes, and the decalcination or smelting of earths
or ores into metals. The absorption of phlogiston in the reduction of calxes
to metals was supposed to explain why pure metals weigh less than do their
calxes.
Lavoisier was bothered by the concept of phlogiston in view of Newtonian
physics, which defined matter in terms of mass and gravitational attraction
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and had no place for negative weight. He was able to show that the gases
and residues produced by combustion gain exactly the weight lost by the air
in which the reaction takes place. He inferred that the combustible material
combines with something from the air that has positive weight instead losing
phlogiston with its negative weight. Lavoisier was able to isolate this ma-
terial, which he called vital air in recognition of its role in supporting life
and which later came to be called oxygen. Priestley isolated the material
about the same time but misidentified it as dephlogisticated air. This is why
Lavoisier is credited with discovering oxygen: he identified oxygen in terms
of its true properties, whereas Priestly isolated oxygen but mis-identified it
as dephlogisticated air. Once Lavoisier had identified oxygen for what it
was, scientists were able to explain calcination in terms of oxidation and
decalcination in terms of the release of oxygen. They soon explained other
phenomena for which phlogiston had been invoked, thus eliminating the need
for phlogiston altogether. With the idea of oxygen in hand, the compound
nature of water was demonstrated and a revolution in chemistry ensued in
which anti-phlogistonists won the field from orthodox phlogistonists.
The experiments of Lavoisier and his colleagues were so persuasive that
the quantitative method in which the components of chemical reactions are
carefully weighed before and after each reaction became standard chemi-
cal procedure. The restructuring of basic concepts and reform of chemical
nomenclature by the new chemists led to the articulation of a set of principles
that hung together as a system that was extremely fertile in implications for
further observations. This led to a vast number of discoveries. At same time,
chemists dismissed many of the observations of prior experimentalists and
artisans as faulty and reinterpreted the remainder to fit the new system. The
system that has evolved under the weight of both the new and the reinterpreted
observations is recognizable in chemistry today, though its principles have
been explained by still more fundamental physical concepts and have been
significantly altered in the process. For example, after Lavoisier physical
theory still retained concepts of matter without mass in the form of caloric
fluid in heat phenomena, electrical fluid in electrical phenomena, and ether as
the medium of light. It took further decades for these concepts to disappear
and Newtonian physics to be vindicated. It remained in place until mass itself
was interpreted as a form of something even more fundamental. The aspects
of scientific procedure illustrated in this example are fundamental and still
practiced today despite immense advances in theory and instrumentation.
Slote would have the moralist utilize a comparable procedure, substituting
moral intuitions for sensory observations. As best I can reconstruct from his
sketchy remarks, he proposes something like the following:
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An ethical theorist begins by collecting moral intuitions that are shared
among credible informants. She includes only those of her own that are not
challenged by the other members of her reference group. She treats shared
intuitions as reliable evidence of the values she will incorporate in her ethical
theory and hence as the empirical base for the theory.
This is analogous to the practice of the scientist who relies on his own ob-
servations when he makes them under appropriate controls and treats the ob-
servations of other scientists whom he has reason to trust as equally reliable.
An ethical theorist and a scientist both dismiss from consideration anomalous
intuitions or anomalous observations reported by unqualified persons. Thus
Lavoisier trusted his own eyes and the eyes of respected colleagues, but was
skeptical of much current chemical lore and many reported phenomena.
An ethical theorist quickly sees that not all the intuitions even of her
reference group are reliable. Their unreliability as well as the unreliability
of putative intuitions of people outside the group is shown by the numerous
paradoxes and incoherences found in reports of intuitions. A common-sense
ethical theorist exposes these flaws and in doing so may ally herself with crit-
ics of common-sense morality. Slote remarks: “What many recent critics of
common-sense morality have been doing is formulating methodological crit-
icisms of the overall shape or the underlying structures . . . of common-sense
morality based on charges of inconsistency, asymmetry, incompleteness, odd-
ness, and the like that are somewhat analogous to the sorts of methodological
criticisms relevant within other kinds of theorizing.”3 The reference to odd-
ness in this list of imperfections alerts us to the likelihood that an ethical
theorist will dismiss a considerable number of intuitions that do not fit her
scheme. In the realm of science, Lavoisier certainly had reason to ignore
many of the observations even of reputable chemists who reported phlogiston
phenomena which could not be explained by the new non-phlogistic theory.
An ethical theorist poses a set of general normative propositions to explain
the reliable intuitive data. On analogy to science, some of the propositions
are reached by simple induction. Others may require an abductive process of
hypothesis formation and confirmation and disconfirmation. By Slote’s lights,
the best ethical theory would explain what is intuitively admirable in persons
and what is intuitively desirable for them to possess. This thesis is analogous
to the generalizations that Lavoisier and his colleagues began to make about
the combining weights of substances that entered into different compounds
and the revisions in the table of elements that this dictated.
An ethical theorist organizes her general propositions into a consistent
whole displaying logical relations among its parts in a perspicuous manner.
She drops the smallest number of pre-critical intuitions that will eliminate
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incoherences from the theory. Thus Slote drops all intuitions of things that are
moral as distinct and independent of things that are admirable or desirable.
Though dropping some alleged intuitions, the theorist also eschews some
possible generalizations so as to avoid having to drop other intuitions that
are particularly vivid. In this dropping and retaining process, she must weigh
gains and losses in theoretical perfection for the system against gains and
losses in its intuitive grounding. In doing so, she should seek a balance be-
tween generalizations and intuitions that Slote, following John Rawls, calls
a “reflective equilibrium.”4 Slote declares his preference for the equilibrium
achieved by his version of virtue ethics. He develops this theory in compe-
tition with the nearest rival for his affections, utilitarianism. In explaining
his preference, he maintains: “No moral view can do without (appeals to)
intuition altogether, and the real question, then – as between, for example,
utilitarianism and virtue ethics – is whether the relatively greater systematic
unity that arises out of an appeal to fewer intuitions can justify the unintuitive
consequences that arise from leaving so many other intuitions to the side.”5
Slote prefers to retain more intuitions at the price of less unity, but this is
not the whole story. He denies that the intuitions to which utilitarians appeal
are sufficient to decide among the varieties of utilitarianism. In his judgment
the under-determination is fatal for utilitarianism as such. The weakness, if
indeed it exists, is due to the dismissal by utilitarians of too many intuitions.
There are not enough left to determine which of the forms of utilitarianism
is correct and perhaps not enough to judge that utilitarianism in any form is
correct.
With a theory based on, and balanced with, intuitions to guide her, an
ethical theorist can then seek more subtle observations to test and revise the
theory. They will take the form of what we may now call critical intuitions. As
Slote asks: “Why should we hold that intuitive but critical moral thinking has
already yielded up its full harvest of moral solutions or abstractly conceived
moral questions?”6 The theorist is likely to find new intuitions and reasons
for reinterpreting old ones in process of dropping inconvenient ones. She may
then have to reconsider her theoretical principles and seek a new equilibrium
between critical or screened intuitions and considered principles. Here the
example of science is heartening. Chemistry took off after the work of Boyle,
Lavoisier, and Dalton in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because sci-
entists now had available well grounded theories from which to generate
hypotheses to guide their search for new phenomena. Slote may hope that
ethical inquiry will take off in like manner, if aretaic concepts replace deontic
concepts.
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2. Gaps in Slote’s Approach
In what remains, I will trace the consequences of the indeterminacy in Slote’s
concept of common-sense intuitions and then his failure provide a metaphys-
ical and psychological foundation for his normative claims. I will argue that
this omits an essential feature of scientific procedure and as a consequence
makes no provision for the kind of theoretic controls on observation that work
so well in science. I will complete the discussion by sketching the foundation
that is needed for an adequate account of virtue, arguing that the nature of
this foundation counts against the possibility of an independent virtue ethic.
Slote remarks that he makes no attempt to “analyze the ethical notions or
terms we have been working with.”7 He thus does not provide a psychological
or epistemological analysis of the process of intuition and gives us no reason
to trust some intuitions over others. This means that there is no reliable body
of intuitions available to justify his theory. Let us review a few details of his
approach.
Slote needs a reliable method for collecting intuitions from trustworthy
sources. However, he does not call for an empirical survey of the opinions
of everyone or of all reflective people, nor does he explain how we might go
about conducting such a survey. He provides no criteria by which we might
identify who is reflective and which of their opinions are considered ones.
He simply declares ex cathedra what the deliverances of common sense are.
When his theory does not rest easy with certain intuitions, he dismisses these
as spurious, leaving a remainder that can be reconciled with his theory. The
only reason he advances for his choices is the strength of his own intuitions
reported in what might be called the confessional mode: “my own tendency,
at this point, is to agree with common-sense virtue-ethical judgment in these
matters and disagree, therefore, with utilitarianism,” “I find myself unable to
go along with the utilitarian view of things,” and “[I am left] with a preference
for [the balance between theory and intuition in his virtue-ethics].”8 To inter-
pret this practice as generously as possible, where Slote says “it seems to me”
or “I find it plausible,” he is inviting us to accept that he is representative of
the reference group with which we ourselves identify and that his judgments
are therefore commonsensical in a sense that we accept. His claims may be
construed as invitations to us to confirm that ethical matters seem the same
to us as they do to him and that he is accurately reporting the shared sense of
our group. We must then be supposed to take our acquiescence as evidence
that he is speaking for our common sense and that there is truth in what he
says.
If Slote, like Aristotle, were using common sense heuristically, he would
not need to worry about confirmation by the opinions of others. It would
not be important whether he had accurately ascertained the deliverances of
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common sense, only whether whatever he took to be common sense had led
him to examine the relevant facts in the world and confirmed that common
sense was correct about them. However, he does not point to facts about
moral choices that are informed by a viable theory of human nature either
to explain which parts of common sense he accepts or to confirm the truth of
his ethical claims. His failure to do so, and the arguments in which he appeals
exclusively to common sense and its supposed intuitions, show that he assigns
more authority to common sense and intuition than is warranted by a merely
heuristic use.
The defects which Slote finds in common-sense thinking – complexity,
asymmetry, and incoherence – are flaws of theory. They may be reduced
by discarding some intuitions which a theory cannot accommodate, but this
opens the possibility that a theory that is more effective in practice might be
obtained by a different selection of intuitions. Hence, a theorist who seeks a
practical theory ought to concern herself with the content, nature, and origins
of the common sense of her community or reference group. Slote, however,
says that it is not his aim to correct practical common sense. He is willing to
let it be and not try to change people’s everyday thinking or ways of living,
perhaps not even his own. He is interested in perfecting his theory by rational-
izing some common-sense intuitions, discarding many, and reinterpreting the
rest in terms of a theory tailored to display theoretical perfections. This denies
him the critical test for his theory to which other common-sense philosophers,
and moralists in general, appeal, the pragmatic test or the test of practice.
A good theory is one that works in practice, one that leads to a successful
resolution of personal and social quandaries. Unless we put our theories into
practice, we will not have an adequate range of intuitions to justify them
in the face of alternative theories. An ethical theorist who eschews exoteric
questions about how her ethical theory works in practice is in no position to
settle esoteric questions about the validity of the theory as a theory. A theorist
who refuses to address practical problems does not have the data necessary
to resolve theoretical ones. The ultimate test of an ethical theory is whether
people live better if they live by it. By staying out of the arena of applied
ethics, Slote provides us no sufficient reason to choose his theory over others
of comparable theoretical perfection and intuitive base, and no reason to want
any theory at all for anything other than intellectual delectation.
What is highlighted by the foregoing discussion, and obvious in any case,
is that there are intuitions and intuitions, among the candidates for evidence
for ethical theory. Genuine intuitions are strewn amidst spurious ones, and it
is not possible to tell which are genuine just by looking at them. Subjective
feelings of confidence, which we express by locutions such as “it seems to me
that” and “if you can’t believe this, you can’t believe anything,” are not per-
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suasive to others whose flux of feelings differ from ours, or even for ourselves
when we view things now in one light and now in another. Yet common-sense
philosophers such as Slote provide no criterion to glean the genuine from the
spurious.
Before we plunge for commonsensism, it is imperative to examine the
relation between theories and intuitions. To tie this point down, let us return
to our consideration of the analogy between ethical theory and science. The
analogy should teach us that our theories have as much to do with our dis-
crimination between genuine and spurious intuitions as our intuitions have to
do with our discrimination between sound and unsound theories. We need to
discard or reinterpret our intuitions when they do not fit our theories as often
as we need to revise our theories to fit our intuitions.
As we have noted, Slote treats intuitions as analogous to empirical obser-
vations in science. While his discussion of the quasi-scientific approach to
ethical theory building is sketchy, he does refer to the steps discussed above.
What is missing is any analogue of the scientist’s use of a theory about the
fundamental nature of things to determine the shape of the special theory
he erects to account for his body of specific phenomena. Lavoisier’s expla-
nation of combustion, identification of oxygen, and dismissal of phlogiston
were not accepted by the scientific community solely on the basis of a few
dramatic experiments. They were accepted because they also helped to show
how chemistry could be reconciled with physics, which had taken Newtonian
form.
In his methodological passages, Slote says nothing about the integration
of ethical theory with a general theory of value or, even more broadly and
fundamentally, a theory of human nature and a metaphysical scheme within
which the theory of human nature in turn is embedded. As far as he explains,
ethical theorists merely seek an equilibrium between a system of well-formed
ethical propositions and an inventory of critical intuitions. They do not restrict
themselves to systems that are coherent with some comprehensive theory of
the nature of things. Different assumptions sanction different intuitions and
lead us to interpret them in different ways. Different interpretations in turn
generate different ethical theories.
In tracing the analogies between ethical and scientific theorizing, we should
keep in mind the theory-ladeness of observations in science. This should lead
us to expect ethical convictions to shape intuitions in a radical way. A quick
glance at familiar facts confirms this expectation. When we move from the
pre-critical state of mind of everyday life to the critical state of mind of an
ethical theorist, we find that our intuitions change. Surely everyone who has
reflected has experienced the shift in gestalt. This means that intuitions do
not simply confirm or disconfirm theories; the adoption of plausible theories
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causes intuitions to change. Hence, we need special rational procedures for
utilizing intuitions to test ethical theories analogous to the procedures for
utilizing empirical observations to test scientific theories; and we should not
expect the procedures in ethics to be any more linear and unidirectional than
the procedures in science. They must include ways of utilizing theories to
assess intuitions, as well as intuitions to assess theories.
Earlier I characterized intuition as a looking at and looking into. Even
where the objects of intuition are provided by the senses, the looking at is
intellectual rather than sensuous and hence subject to the influence of the
deposit of theories in the back of a viewer’s mind. To work the data of the
senses into a form where they bear logically on a theory, it is not enough to
look at an object, event, action, state of affairs, or trait of character. We must
read off information about it from it. We must articulate the data in some
language that is semantically and syntactically related to the language used
in the theory. At the very outset we must subsume the data under categories
and form judgments in terms of the relations that obtain among things of those
categories. Categories come in sets. We must use either A, B, C, . . . or P, Q,
R, . . ., but not both. We may judge that A is B, or A is not B, but not that A is
P, or A is not P. Since sets of categories go with specific theories, the choice
of categories constrains the choice of theories and, conversely, commitment
to a theory confines us to a set of categories and so intimately affects what we
report that we have observed.
The common sense or shared opinions of different groups of different
times and places supplies different sets of concepts with which to interpret
experience and evaluate actions, motives, and persons. This is true even where
the same or cognate names are used for cognate concepts, for example, arete,
virtu and virtue as names in different languages for certain traits of character.
To see such facts as this, we have to stand outside of a culture and pass
judgment on what passes as common sense in it.
Slote acknowledges this casually. He takes for granted that he is equipped
to do so when he criticizes the Victorian notion of morality: “In the light
of what seems to be a genuinely deeper understanding of human psycho-
logical phenomena, a totally self-sacrificing, selfless individual would auto-
matically be suspected of masochism, of being burdened by inordinate and
misdirected guilt, and one really doesn’t, therefore, have to be a Nietzsche
or an Ayn Rand nowadays to take such a view of (Victorian highminded)
selflessness.”9 Slote observes that it is hard for us to share Kierkgaard’s admi-
ration of Abraham because we do not accept the framework of Kierkegaard
and his contemporaries.10 He refers to “ordinary Greek thought” in ques-
tioning whether Aristotle is commonsensical on a particular point.11 And he
remarks that only recently have we come to condemn slavery, and only very
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recently inequality of job opportunities for women.12 Thus, he recognizes that
common sense is often wrong even when it really is common or shared by an
entire society.
In an age of broadcast ideas, even the least educated person is exposed to a
variety of ethical concepts from a plethora of moral traditions. The reflective
person familiar with a broad range of examples provided by anthropology
and history is in a position to reject whole bodies of common sense as less
satisfactory than other bodies. This applies to the common sense of her own
group. We have the option of rejecting our community’s way of looking at the
world for that of other communities. Thus in the twentieth century General
Patton chose to live by the code of Achilles, and Mother Teresa by that of
the medieval saint. Some people exchange their Western ways for the ways
of Buddhism or Islam. Personally, the genial humanism of eighteenth-century
Hume appeals to me more than the stern moralism of nineteenth-century Kant
or the calculative contractarianism of twentieth-century Rawls.
Moreover, the community with which a rational person identifies need not
be an actual one, present or past, but an ideal one informed by an ideally
perfected ethic. By that I do not mean an ethic for ideal or superhuman per-
sons, which Slote rightfully rejects, but an ethic ideal for people as they are
or and ethic that will help them become what they could be.13 Thus we find
non-violent vegetarian communitarian pacifists in our midst, and some people
even dare to live by the Law of Love.
3. The Metaphysics of Virtue
Presumably ethical theory is about an aspect of reality from which the social
sciences abstract. What the aspect may be for Slote is suggested by the way
he characterizes the key concepts of his own theory, virtue and personal good.
Virtues are admirable traits of persons and personal goods are things that are
desirable for them. Slote does not state whether he thinks that “virtue” refers
to things insofar as they are admired or whether he takes admiration only as
a criterion for the application of the term. Is something admirable because
we can admire it, or do we admire it because something about it makes it
admirable? This is on a par with the question, is something good because
we can desire it, or do we desire it because something about it makes it
good? The “able” in “admirable” and “desirable” is ambiguous. It can refer to
something that can be admired or desired, or it can mean something that ought
to be admired or desired, or something that would be by a properly prepared
observer. The “can” sense is clearly too broad: “does” implies “can” and in
point of fact someone does admire practically every trait of persons, even
those that disgust most people, and someone does desire practically every
THE HEURISTIC USE OF COMMON SENSE 475
thing, including things that repel most people. Practically anything we might
mention is admirable or desirable in the sense that it can be admired or de-
sired. Slote must have one of the narrower senses of admirable and desirable
in mind.
His appeal to common sense suggests that Slote takes the criteria for the
application of the terms to involve admiration and desire by all or most people
or reflective people. Yet this does not seem to be exactly what he has in mind.
He appears to use “admirable” and “desirable” for what should be admired
and desired. “The admirable” signifies a trait of a person which makes her
worthy of being admired and “the desirable” signifies a feature of a thing
that makes it worthy of being desired. Being admired and desired are only
signs, and hardly sufficient or necessary ones, that something is admirable or
desirable. They are not what the terms mean or refer to.
This does not mean that the admirable and desirable are absolute prop-
erties rather than relational ones. It does not mean that they are traits of a
thing in itself rather than traits of a thing in relation to something else. For
example, a trait may be worthy of admiration if it is related in a certain way
to the needs or the quality of existence of the one who possesses it, or to
the needs or quality of existence of people who interact with the person.
The same applies to things worthy of desire. Slote appears to have this in
mind in some of his statements about goods. Here some assumptions about
human nature do creep into his analysis. After arguing that certain virtues are
appropriate to a person’s time of life, social circumstances, or features of her
world as contrasted to other possible worlds, Slote asserts that “friendship
and love, even if not good for every possible being or person, may none
the less be good for men and women, personal goods relative to our sort of
nature.”14 He goes on to say: “Moreover, since what is (a personal) good
for humans is supposedly a function of basic human needs (desires), such
mankind-relativity of goods . . . runs no risk of the sort of relativism which, by
making values depend on choice or belief, makes them seem subjective. What
is not absolute may none the less be objective.”15 From these remarks, I infer
that Slote believes that ethical theory should provide a systematic description
of what is objectively valuable to people, given human nature and the human
condition. Yet he disappoints, for he provides no descriptions of either the
valuable or human nature, nor does he indicate where he would look to find
such descriptions.
I believe that the touchstone for admirable and desirable human qualities
and possessions is to be found in their contribution to a satisfactory exis-
tence. An adequate conception of a satisfactory existence must be derived
from experience with alternative ways of living. The conceptions that our
experiences and those of other persons suggest must be refined by interpreting
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the experiences in terms of all that the sciences have to tell us about human
nature and the human condition. The results of the sciences in turn have to
be understood in terms of a coherent metaphysical framework before we can
find the final meaning of axiological or any other kind of concepts.
The metaphysics of virtue is crucial for the discussion of virtue ethics. Un-
der my conception, the genus of virtue is acquired disposition. Its differentia
is excellence. Virtues are excellent acquired dispositions in human beings.
They are excellent because they are actualized in activities that are good in
themselves or contribute to good ends. Thus virtues are admirable, by which
I mean that they should be admired, precisely because they tend to produce
good actions.
Aristotle observes that we know potentialities in a person through their
actualizations.16 I would add that we know them as excellences because we
see that the activities in which they are actualized are good. We know that a
person is just when he acts justly and takes pleasure in just actions, and we
know that justice is a virtue because just actions are essential to community
and human flourishing. This means that we must have a criterion for just acts
before we can understand justice as a trait of character and appreciate it as
a virtue. This metaphysical and epistemological truth throws us right back
into the dispute among utilitarians and Kantians, as well as contractarians
and other ethical theorists, about the right and the good. What is good about
just acts, their utility, conformity to moral law, or place in the social contract?
We should note that some people consider excellences of character as
good independent of the good actions they produce. Aristotle himself hints
at this when he says “the virtue of a human being [is] the state that makes a
human being good and makes him perform his function well.”17 This suggests
that being good is distinct from performing functions well, since the state
precedes the performance and the performance may be blocked. Thus, a deep
analysis of virtue might convince us that its presence in this universe is an
intrinsic good over and above the good actions it disposes a virtuous person
to perform. If that is the case, virtue ethics would be a coeval department with
consequential and deontological ethics as part of a system that embraces all
of the virtuous, the good, and the right as equi-primordial, though it would
not displace them as the foundation for ethics as such.
4. A Last Word from Aristotle
Both the value and the proof of an ethical theory are to be found in its appli-
cation to practice. For this reason it is reasonable to seek out the advice of the
wise about how to live. Since Aristotle was the wisest of us all, it would be
wonderful if we could consult with him about our own lives, though even if
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we could, we should not take his word for things, as he would be the first to
advise. We know more than Aristotle, since we know Aristotle and more.
If Aristotle had known what we know, the following is what he might have
said about the matters we have discussed.
I had the good fortune to have been raised well. I had fine parents who
attended to my moral training and I spent my early years in well-governed, if
provincial, Greek cities. I was exposed to cultivated people such as the nobles
at the court of Amyntas. I was educated by the greatest philosopher at the very
best school in the most civilized city of the world. These influences instilled
in me the moral and intellectual virtues at a high level. They developed in me
the pivotal virtue of practical wisdom.
Except for a few times of hardship and danger, I enjoyed good fortune
throughout my days on earth. I lived a long and variegated life in which I
had ample scope to exercise virtue to the fullest. My personal experience and
my inquiries in association with the best minds of the day enabled me to see
clearly what was best for myself. They enabled me to see better than most
what is best for humanity at large.
I not only acknowledge, I proclaim in piety and gratitude that I acquired
many of my ideas from the philosophers, poets, statesmen, and other dis-
tinguished men of a large number of Greek polities. I learned much from
their traditions and practices. Whatever I took from others, however, I did my
thinking for myself. I examined the beliefs of others critically and I modified,
supplemented, and integrated them in my own distinctive way. The proof of
my theories, therefore, lies in the nature of things. It lies in human nature
and the enduring features of the human condition, not in the way my theories
originated. My ideas are correct because they are true to reality, as a qualified
observer can see for himself, not because I was introduced to them by people
whose insight had penetrated some distance into the nature of things.
I had to reject many of the ideas urged on me because they were patently
false in view of the facts. I had to see the truth of the remainder for myself.
Otherwise I would not have known which ideas to keep and which to reject,
whom to listen to and whom to ignore, whom to believe and whom to refute.
From what I hear, the human virtues in your age have been sadly neglected
both in theory and in practice. In saying this, however, I do not imply that
ethical theory is bankrupt in its analysis of the right and the good. After all,
the concept of virtue cannot be defined without the concept of the right or, as
I would prefer to put it, of the noble and just. It certainly cannot be defined
independently of the concept of the good, since virtues are dispositions and
both the nature and the value of dispositions depend on the activities that
actualize them. Particular virtues in a person can be identified only by ob-
serving how he acts. Judging how he acts presupposes a criterion for virtuous
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actions apart from the fact that they are acts of a virtuous person. Thus, both
to understand the virtues and to ascertain their presence in individual people,
we must bring facts of the matter to bear. We must determine the role of the
virtues in the good life in the good society, which is a matter of scientific
observation.
In comparing the foundations of my ethical system with those of the sys-
tems of you moderns, I freely concede that there are facts of which you are
aware and I am not, since 2,000 years of human experience are available to
you for scrutiny. Tell me about these facts and I will revise my views. But
please do not babble about the authority of the many or even of the cultivated
or the wise. And drop that ridiculous oxymoron, “common sense.”
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